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Abstract
Corruption has become one of the most popular topics in the social scientiﬁc disciplines. However,
there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication about corruption. Models developed by different
academic disciplines are often isolated from each other. The purpose of this paper is to review several
major approaches to corruption and draw them closer to each other. Most studies of corruption fall
into three major categories: (i) rational-actor models where corruption is viewed as resulting from
cost/beneﬁt analysis of individual actors; (ii) structural models that focus on external forces that
determine corruption; and (iii) relational models that emphasize social interactions and networks
among corrupt actors. Focusing on actors’ behavior and the social context, this article explains
corruption concepts taken from sociology, economics, organization studies, political science, social
anthropology, and social psychology.
Introduction
Corruption is an elusive phenomenon conceptually. Its literature is enormous, and most
disciplines in the social sciences attempt to say something about it. Unfortunately, there is a lack
of interdisciplinary communication about corruption, such that models developed by different
academic disciplines are often isolated from each other. However, each social science has
revealed interesting and important features of corruption, so it is worth drawing them closer
to each other. Hence, this paper reviews corruption concepts taken from social anthropology,
economics, political science, social psychology, sociology, and organization studies.
Many studies of corruption fall into three major categories: (i) a micro-level perspective
where corruption is viewed as resulting from rational decisions of individual actors; (ii) a
macro perspective that focuses on social norms and the structural arrangements that facilitate
corruption; and (iii) a relational approach that examines social interactions and networks
among corrupt actors. This paper brings some coherence to the extensive literature on
corruption. It provides an interdisciplinary overview of the three major approaches to
corruption, focusing on actors’ behavior and the social context. The article tries to reﬂect
the broader social scientiﬁc context and theoretical background related to each approach.
Finally, it argues that relational approach has the potential to integrate the other two
paradigms and link rational actors with structural elements.
Conceptualization of corruption
We can ﬁnd dozens of competing and sometimes contradictory deﬁnitions of corruption in
the literature. Some studies offer interesting overviews of such deﬁnitions (Kurer 2005;
Pellegrini 2011; Williams 1999). Rather than try to resolve the deﬁnitional problem, this
paper will provide a framework for comparing and contrasting the predominant approaches
in corruption studies. Here, I will use corruption as a broad umbrella term based on four
minimal, sometimes implicit, conceptual elements that one ﬁnds across most disciplines.
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First, there seems to be a consensus that corruption is an informal/illegal and secret
exchange of formally allocated resources. In other words, money, goods, or other resources,
which are considered to belong to an organization or collectivity, are instead handled or
exchanged covertly in ways that beneﬁt one or more persons who are not the formal owner.
Some scholars deﬁne corruption in a way that rules out non-governmental foci (Friedrich
1993; Rose-Ackerman 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; World Bank 1997). Others claim
that corruption can be found in private ﬁrms or in NGOs as well (Aguilera and Vadera
2008; Argandona 2003; Ashforth and Anand 2003; Bayar 2005; Pellegrini 2011, 19; Shore
and Haller 2005, 18). Without trying to resolve this debate, we can say at minimum that
corruption occurs in a formal organizational context.
Second, at least one corrupt party has to have formal membership/afﬁliation or at least a
contractual relation with the organization from which the resources are extracted
(Della Porta and Vannucci 2012, 2–3). This distinguishes corruption from other criminal
activities where the criminals do not have a formal afﬁliation to the organization from where
the resources are illegally extracted. A robber who breaks into an ofﬁce and steals its resources
is not classiﬁed as corrupt.
Third, corruption happens between two or more corrupt parties (Pellegrini 2011, 20;
Varese 2000). There is one party who “sells” the resources and another party who compensates
that individual for them. It might seem like a commonplace, but the existence of the second
corrupt party distinguishes corruption from other organizational misdeeds such as embezzle-
ment, fraud, or theft when the actor illegally acquires his/her organizational resources;
however, in these cases, there is no second party, a “buyer” of such resources involved
(Della Porta and Vannucci 2012, 7; Varese 2000).
Fourth, a corrupt act is always a deviation from social rules or expectations of some kind
(Friedrich 1993, 15; Huntington 1968, 59; Lovell 2005, 67–68; Serra and Wantchekon
2012). These rules vary greatly in form: sometimes corruption involves the violation of
written contracts; sometimes legal codes are broken; and sometimes moral codes are
transgressed but not laws. Given these four common elements, scholars have built several
different models for understanding corruption that can be classiﬁed into three major categories.
I summarize these approaches next.
Corruption as utility maximization: a rational-actor approach
In the micro-level rational-actor approach, corruption is treated as if it is a strict market
transaction despite being an illegal one. In its pure form, this model of corruption is closely
linked to neoclassical economics in which atomized individuals pursue utility maximization
in their exchanges under the conditions of scarcity (Smith 1776). Thus, actors engage in
corruption because according to their personal cost/beneﬁt analysis, acting in a corrupt
manner seems to be the most rational decision that will maximize their personal proﬁt. This
utilitarian tradition in the social sciences views people as atomized or “undersocialized” actors
who are minimally affected by social relations (Granovetter 1985). In rational-actor analyses,
only two corrupt actors, an agent, and a client are involved, while their identities and past
relations are typically neglected factors because they are thought to be unimportant.
In rational-actor models of corruption, core concepts include an idea of the
dysfunctionality of state institutions. One common argument is that there is a clear division
between the public and private spheres (Lennerfors 2009; Williams 1999) and that corruption
happens only in government institutions that constitute a “foreign body within the market
sphere” (Van Klaveren 1989, 25). The extension of government and its authority into the
economic sphere distorts the functioning of the market and creates new incentives for
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corrupt public ofﬁcers and opportunities for rent seeking private ﬁrms (Acemoglu and
Verdier 2000; Banﬁeld 1975; Krueger 1974; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Treisman 2000;
Tullock 1996).
However, the relationship between state intervention and corruption is not straightfor-
ward. Empirical studies found that a higher level of public intervention, for example in
Scandinavian and Northern European countries, may even be associated with a very low level
of corruption (Della Porta and Vannucci 2012, 11–12; Hopkin and Rodriguez-Pose 2007).
Such results suggest that variables other than the level of government intervention might also
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the level of corruption.
The principal–agent dilemma
There are many scholars in economics and political science who view corruption as a
particular instance of a more general principal–agent dilemma (Banﬁeld 1975; Klitgaard
1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). According to this approach, an
agent is a manager or a public ofﬁcer who, due to his/her employment contract, is under
an obligation to act on behalf of his/her principal and serve the principal’s interest as if it were
his or her own. The principal may be a ruler or an owner or may represent the general
public. In order to serve the principal’s interest, an agent must exercise some discretion in
their own decision-making and work but the desires and goals of the principal and the agent
may be different or may diverge over time. Moreover, it may be difﬁcult or expensive for the
principal to monitor what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling
1976). An agent becomes corrupt and collects bribes when he intentionally sacriﬁces his
principal’s or his organization’s interest to his own and betrays his trust (Banﬁeld 1975;
Rose-Ackerman 1975; Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
A major emphasis in the principal–agent literature is on the proper incentive and punish-
ment structures and price mechanisms that can resolve the problem of corruption (Bardhan
2006; Becker and Stigler 1974; Rose-Ackerman 1986). Empirical studies suggest that higher
salaries of civil servants lead to lower corruption (Azfar and Nelson 2007; Van Rijckeghem
and Weder 2001). The principal should also make corrupt acts costly to the rule-violating
agent. Using laboratory experiments, economic researchers and social psychologists conclude
that the possibility of detection and of negative sanctions in fact discourage individuals from
taking bribe or paying kickback (Abbink 2005; Abbink 2006; Abbink et al. 2002; Hegarty
and Sims 1978; Laczniak and Inderrieden 1987; Trevino 1986).
Critics of the principal–agent approach have noted that this framework, especially in
public organizations where the principal represents the interest of the general public, might
be useless as an analytical tool in circumstances where the principal becomes corrupt as well,
and does not act in the interest of the organization or the public good (Persson et al. 2010;
Rothstein 2011, 99–104). In that case, there will be no actors able to monitor and punish
corrupt behavior.
Bad apples in formal organizations
Much of the literature in organization studies has focused on whether corruption is an
individual or an organizational issue (Coleman 1987; Sherman 1980; Wheeler and Rothman
1982). This problem is sometimes called, the ‘bad apples vs. bad barrels dichotomy’ (Ashforth
et al. 2008; Brass et al. 1998; Kish-Gephart et al. 2010; Pinto et al. 2008; Trevino and
Youngblood 1990). Both ‘principal–agent’ and ‘bad apple’ concepts view corrupt
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participants in an organization as rational actors; however, principal–agent models tend to
view all employees as potentially bad apples (corrupt) if incentives are poorly structured,
while ‘bad apples’ theorists tend to claim that most employees are not corrupt. A ‘bad apple’
is an exceptional and problematic person, in the latter view. However, if a few negative
group members poison otherwise ‘good apples’, the contagion of personal corruption may
reach a critical threshold, when the organization becomes a ‘bad barrel’ and can be consid-
ered corrupt as a whole (Andersson and Pearson 1999; Felps et al. 2006; Misangyi et al.
2008; Trevino and Youngblood 1990). Psychologists have examined why bad apples are
psychologically different from normal organizational actors. These studies have identiﬁed
several personality traits, such as high irresponsibility, hedonism, and narcissism, as well as
low self control, integrity, and conscientiousness, that substantially correlate with white-
collar criminal activities (Blickle et al. 2006; Collins and Schmidt 1993; Gottfredson and
Hirschi 1990, 15; Simpson 2013).
Corruption as social constraint: a structural approach
According to the structural approach, corruption is not viewed as an individual act or
decision but rather as a phenomenon that is institutionalized and embedded into larger social
structure (Anders and Nuijten 2008). Here, social factors beyond the individual determine
ways of acting. In contrast to the rational-actor approach that focuses on micro-level
face-to-face transactions, the structural approach provides explanations of corruption at
macrostructural or organizational levels.
The literature distinguishes between two structural elements in corruption. The ﬁrst one is
related to social norms and culture that mainly represent the symbolic and often unconscious
realm of social life. The second type refers to a more visible and material structure. These
types also reﬂect the long-standing debate in macro sociology that distinguishes between
ideational and material structural forces (Adler and Borys 1993; Collins 2005, 133; Hinings
and Tolbert 2008, 475–476).
Normative explanations
The “oversocialized view of man” in social theory treats human behavior as totally shaped by
common social norms (Wrong 1961). A ‘social norm’ is understood as a socially acceptable
behavior and deviations from that behavior are usually sanctioned by society (Varese
2000). Actors seek a favorable self-image and the approval of others and hence, through
socialization, they “internalize” consensually developed social norms and values of a given
society. As a result of this internalization, people do not perceive obedience as a burden
but as something totally normal (Granovetter 1985).
Empirical studies suggest that the willingness of actors to engage in corruption reﬂects the
universalistic social norms and values that people internalized in the countries where they
grew up. People from highly corrupt countries show more willingness of rule breaking (Barr
and Serra 2010; Fisman and Miguel 2008, 82–94). One common normative explanation of
corruption is related to religious norms and beliefs. Cross-national comparative studies have
argued that corruption is higher in countries where more hierarchical forms of religion such
as Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam are prevailing, whereas the level of corruption
tends to be lower in countries with a larger proportion of Protestant population (Della Porta
and Vannucci 2012, 62–63; La Porta et al. 1997; Paldam 2001; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000;
Treisman 2000). In cultures with hierarchical and strongly centralized religions and a general
acceptance of power differences between people are more likely to engage in corruption
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because of paternalism, autocracy, and reduced trust caused by the high power inequality
(Banuri and Eckel 2012; Husted 1999). Another empirical study conﬁrmed signiﬁcant
norm-related gender differences in corruption (Steffensmeier et al. 2013). Universalistic
social norms, which disapprove female deviance and encourage male competitiveness,
decisiveness, and risk-taking, signiﬁcantly contribute to low-level female involvement in
serious illegal corporate activities and conspiracy networks.
Other normative explanations of corruption focus on the small group-level of the
phenomenon. Some early sociological and anthropological studies recognized that subgroups
in a society regulate their relations with their members by their own legal or normative
system (Ehrlich 1936; Moore 1973; Pospisil 1958, 272; Simmel 1955, 163–165). The main
argument here is that particularistic norms that regulate the behavior of small groups (friends,
kin, classmates, or colleagues) may become dominant over society-wide universalistic formal
norms (Parsons 1937, 455; Schweitzer 2004). Particularistic norms imply that people should
share limited resources in a particular way, very often with their closest family members
and friends and not with everyone else (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). Therefore, subgroup
membership and its insider norm system can explain corruption.
The concept of the subgroup norm system is especially applicable in a formal organizational
context where artiﬁcially created local groups, “work-related subcultures,” provide an even
sharper distinction between the organization and the “mainstream social life and its construction
of reality” (Blau 1955, 179–180; Holzner 1968, 95). Scholars have recognized that the enforce-
ment of external regulations within an organization is often difﬁcult because the organization
may create an insider norm, a culture of silence and cover-up where even honest members
show solidarity with their deviant and corrupt colleagues (Katz 1977).
Corruption may become institutionalized in organizations when stable and repetitive pat-
terns of illegal activity emerge as everyday mechanical actions that are carried out by members
without much thought or reﬂection about the nature of their actions (Ashforth and Anand
2003). In these cases, otherwise, morally normal persons can routinely engage in corrupt prac-
tices in organizations without seeing their acts as wrong. Finally, organizations produce a culture
in which deviation from formal rules and procedures is normal and acceptable (Vaughan 1996).
Scholars in a school known as “New Institutional Economics” (NIE) analyze corruption
from inside the corrupt relationship and examine how corrupt actors design institutions that
reduce uncertainties and protect themselves from opportunistic behavior (e.g. betrayal) of the
corrupt partner (Della Porta and Vannucci 2012, 2–3; Lambsdorff 2002; Lambsdorff et al.
2004). NIE scholars argue that, contrary to legal agreements, corrupt contracts cannot be
enforced through legal ways (e.g. by the courts). Corrupt deals are made secretly, and therefore
the transaction costs – transaction-speciﬁc investments such as money, time, or energy – to keep
activities such as partner searching, negotiating, and agreement-enforcement hidden are signif-
icantly higher than in business relations in normal markets. Repeated corrupt transactions
automatically lead to a higher level of trust between the agent and the recipient. Such social
institution structures the corrupt situation, stabilizes the prices for a particular action, and
reduces the transaction costs of corruption (Della Porta and Vannucci 2004). In the economic
literature, this type of trust-based corruption is often called parochial corruption (Bunker and
Cohen 1983; Husted 1994; Scott 1972, 89).
Material structural explanations
Material structural concepts explain corruption with “more materially constrained levels and
imperatives of the social system” (Alexander and Smith 1993). A number of survey researchers
seek to identify macro-level structural factors responsible for the level of corruption in a
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country. Research based on analyses of corruption indices across countries suggests that
increased economic competition and economic growth are negatively related to corruption
(Treisman 2000). This approach ﬁnds that formal democratic institutions reduce corruption
but only over the long term, while emergent democratization may even increase the level of
corruption (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Treisman 2000). Structural factors and corruption
may also mutually reinforce each other. For example, greater inequality fosters higher levels
of corruption, while a higher level of corruption increases social inequality (You and Khagram
2005). Corruption also has substantial impact on other macrostructural factors such as economic
growth, public expenditures, tax collection, gender equality, “brain drain”, and so on (Mauro
2004; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013).
In contrast to the ﬁndings that economic competition reduces corruption at the country
level, the literature in organization studies emphasizes that an intensely competitive environ-
ment can drive organizational members to engage in misconduct, rule-breaking, and corrupt
activities (Baucus 1994; Baucus and Near 1991, MacLean 2001; Szwajkowski 1985; Zahra
et al. 2005). Here, the competition for customers, contracts, and other limited resources lures
organizations to pressure their employees to behave illegally by setting unrealistic ﬁnancial
and sales goals (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Brief et al. 2001; Vaughan 1983, 59, 1996).
There is a possible explanation of the contradictory impacts of competition on corruption
at national and organization levels. Cross-country measures reﬂect the degree of competition
and corruption in highly aggregated, and often, indirect ways while organization-level data
provides more precise information on the competitive and institutional environment of
particular organizations (Alexeev and Song 2013). National data does not reﬂect ﬁrm-level
variation. Corruption may be very high in certain economic sectors with ﬁerce competition
but low at general national level.
Some scholars found other organizational structural features responsible for illegal
activities. For example, large ﬁrm size, plentiful slack resources, ﬁrms with more complex
organizational structures, activity remote from supervision, frequent interaction with
costumers, lower dividend payments, and higher executive compensation in the form of
salary and bonuses provide opportunity structures to conduct corrupt practices (Baucus and
Near 1991; Graycar and Sidebottom 2012; Prechel and Zheng 2012; Vaughan 1996).
Corruption as social exchange: a relational approach
This approach focuses on webs of social relations. The main premise of the relational
perspective on corruption is that individuals associate with one another because they
proﬁt from their associations (Blau 1964, 12–32). This leads to an interest in sustain-
ing informal exchange relationships that parallel formal organizational and legal
structures.
Two main corruption models have emerged from the literature of the relational approach:
horizontally and vertically structured corrupt networks. The ﬁrst one focuses on corrupt
exchanges when there is a trust-based and intimate relationship among the actors. In the
second model, corruption happens between unequal actors and power dynamics are impor-
tant components of exchanges.
Relational models examine illegal activities by focusing on interpersonal connections such
as non-monetary forms of exchange, reciprocity, favors, and other interactions between
corrupt actors at the small group level. The relational approach is derived from anthropolog-
ical traditions such as studies of Mauss’s (1954), Malinowski’s (1922), and Lévi-Strauss’ (1969)
on social exchange and reciprocity.
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Relational approach argues that a strictly economic analysis of corrupt exchanges is not
sufﬁcient to understand the logic of corruption (Lomnitz 1988). Corrupt transactions, as well
as gift giving, do not always require immediate return; thus, there is a gap between transfer
and counter-transfer and therefore most corrupt practices cannot be characterized strictly as
market transactions (Blundo 2008; Davies et al. 2009; Morris and Polese ; Smart 1993).
Gift-giving creates gift-debt that has to be repaid in the future (Bourdieu 1997; Gouldner
1960; Mauss 1954). When corrupt exchanges are separated in time and the transfer and
counter-transfer have different forms actors can easily blur the corrupt nature of their
transaction (Hipp and Lawler 2010). There is also one important difference between the
rational-actor and relational approaches: in rational-actor models, corrupt exchange happens
between only two actors, an agent and a client, while the relational approach considers a
wider network of participants. Moreover, in contrast to economic theories that treat corrup-
tion as a pathology, the relational approach suggests that phenomena such as informal
personal networks, personal trust, patronage, loyalty, and gift-giving may be complementary
and necessary arrangements for maintaining social stability (Shore and Haller 2005). Interac-
tions that look like corruption to outside observers might serve crucial social and symbolic
functions from the inside or in a local context (Smith 2007, 10).
Horizontal networks
Personal social networks that are based on long term social relationships allow individuals to
deal with inadequate formal institutions, the imperfections of state or market-dominated
socioeconomic systems. Members in these kinds of networks often see their informal acts
as just helping a friend or a friend’s friend (Ledeneva 1998). Such networks can be found
all around the world: they are known as pull in America, blat in Russia, compadrazgo in Latin
America, protexia in Israel, palanca in Mexico, guanchi in China, and so on (Lomnitz 1988).
Networkmembers circulate resources such as inside information, political support, admission
to a good school, and bureaucratic favors such as acquiring certiﬁcates, licenses, between and
within public and private sector organizations (Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 2004). One speciﬁc
form of horizontal networks is nepotism when people provide organizational positions for
kin members and thus violate the impersonal meritocratic recruitment standards of the organi-
zation (Jaskiewicz et al. 2013). Another adaptation to the inadequacy of formal institutions is
guanxi – the expanded network of friends in China. Guanxi is based on the obligatory norm
of reciprocity (Smart and Hsu 2008). A person has to respond to a gift with greater muniﬁcence
(Yang 1994, 143). Indeed, guanxi is an instrumental friendship system. Similar to guanxi, in the
former Soviet Union, ordinary people used blat as a personal informal network to obtain goods
and services in short supply and to ﬁnd a way around formal procedures (Ledeneva 1998).
Russian people used blat as a special form of barter, a non-monetary exchange because, in
the socialist planned economy, money did not function as the main tool of economic transac-
tions. Blat was a “survival kit” that helped to reduce uncertainty in conditions of shortage,
exigency and perpetual emergency when formal rights were insufﬁcient.
Vertical networks
Informal networks are dynamic. Although individuals are generally interested in maintaining
balanced social exchanges there are also aspirations to establish superiority over others
(Blau 1964, 26). A symmetrical, horizontal reciprocity relationship may become unbalanced,
for example, when one party becomes superior to the other, and transform into an asymmet-
rical power relationship (Granovetter 2007; Lomnitz 1982). This form is often called a
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patron–client relationship (Boissevain 1989; Wolf 1966). Although patronage is still a very
personal and informal relationship based on the norm of reciprocity, the lower-status
individual cannot reciprocate with favors or cash, so he/she has to balance the account with
more intangible assets by providing respect, admiration, loyalty, or subordination to the
person with superior status (Campbell 1989; Wolf 1966). Although there is often a formal
hierarchical boss–subordinate relationship between them, beyond this formality, the partners
may engage in intricate conspiracies when the client does the “dirty work” for his/her boss/
patron and in return is rewarded with formal organizational resources, for example, by extra
bonuses (Jackall 2010, 18–44). In some cases, the entire governmental systems are based on
patronage when politicians appoint their clients to positions in state administrations to
illegally extract organizational resources from the system (Kopecký and Mair 2012).
Conclusion
In this article, I reviewed three major approaches to corruption. Each of them has revealed
important dimensions and key features of corruption. Table 1 shows a summary of the
differences between these main categories.
This paper argues that future research on corruption may usefully revisit the relational
paradigm because it has strong but idle explanatory potential, and yet the current it lacks
of satisfactory theoretical and empirical results. There are three main reasons why the
relational approach may be an important framework for future research. First, it focuses on
real-life transactions instead of secondary and non-direct measurement of corruption.
Second, it offers a more dynamic perspective on corruption than the static and substantialist
rational-actor and structural models. Finally, the relational approach provides a suitable
conceptual framework to integrate the other two approaches.
Structural and rational-actor models typically use secondary data sources such as
perception-based indexes, survey results (attitudes) or laboratory experiments to examine
corruption. Such studies have some merits, but they cannot provide us insight into deep
structural and dynamical characters of the phenomenon. This paper argues that innovative
Table 1. Major corruption approaches
Rational-actor approach Structural approach Relational approach
Level of analysis Micro Macro, and middle Middle
Motivation/constraint
to participate in
corruption
Maximize monetary
rewards and minimize costs
Forced by structural
constraints
Proﬁt from the
associations with others
Exchange form Economic/market Driven by norms and
material structural
constraints
Reciprocal, often
non-material
Relationship form Impersonal, short term Relationship between
individual and collective
entities
Interpersonal, long term
Corruption from an
organizational
perspective
Corruption is an exceptional
problem within the organization:
bad apple
Corruption is systematic
products of collective
processes: bad barrel
Corruption is an informal
exchange network behind
formal organizational
structures
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corruption research should analyze real-life cases. Since the main focus of relational approach
is on actual transactions, this view provides a perfect starting point for the examination of
corrupt exchanges.
Both rational and structural models provide static and substantialist descriptions of social
reality (Crossley 2004, 265–273). The concepts of norms and material structures that
inﬂuence individual behavior are rather mechanical (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). Once
we know the normative or structural factors related to an individual “everything else in
behavior is automatic, since they are so well socialized” (Granovetter 1985). For example,
following this logic and based on the actor’s Protestant or Catholic religious preference,
one might clearly determine his/her motivation to be corrupt. However, in the real
world, even actors’ religious beliefs as well as other external normative phenomena are not
always once-and-for-all inﬂuences but rather constant processes, continuously constructed,
reconstructed, and altered during interactions with other people. The rational models were
also regarded as substantialist, because once certain aspects of the transaction are given, the
actor’s underlying interests remain unaltered (Emirbayer 1997). In such cases, the rather
passive rational actor can choose between only a very few strategies at a time. However, in
reality, even in seemingly pure market-type corrupt transactions, when partners do not know
each other in advance and probably will not meet again in the future, a wide variety of possible
transaction patterns may occur. External structural factors such as time constraints and the
physical environment determine the actors’ opportunity structure and participants with differ-
ent social backgrounds may follow different strategies. For example, middle-class and elite
members may try to avoid making corrupt deals with low-level agents while working-class
and small entrepreneur clients more often participate in such transactions (Jancsics 2013).
There is a long-standing debate in the social sciences about how cultural, normative, or
material structures interrelate with actual social action, and with individual decisions involving
human agency. The relational approach to understanding corruption has the potential to link
rational actors with structural elements, or in other words, to bridge agency with structure in
corruption research. Interactions and relationships shape both the individual and society and
thus relational models have the sufﬁcient theoretical and analytical framework to uncover mi-
cro-level face-to-face interactions of individuals while also considering macro-level institutional
embeddedness (Bandelj 2012; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). For example, social networks
can be viewed as “pipelines” of social inﬂuence that contribute to the adoption and diffusion
of normative and cultural elements (Mische 2011). The analysis of micro-level individual
decisions of human agency cannot avoid social networks either. Agency is always
agency-in-relation. Social networks have strong impact upon agency, individual decisions
and strategies because actors enter into transactions with surrounding persons, places,
meanings, and events (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).
Future research directions
The relational literature on corruption is outdated, and we can ﬁnd only a few systematic
pieces of research with a primary focus on corruption. In many cases, corruption-related
ﬁndings were only byproducts of earlier anthropological projects with rather broader
research goals. Analyses of concrete corrupt transactions within relational contexts may be
based on quantitative as well as qualitative research techniques. One possible direction would
involve quantitative research, examining corrupt social networks by analyzing, for example,
public procurement statistics, business registers, and other ofﬁcial archival data. Due to the
technological revolution of the 21st century, such data have become available as digitized or-
ganizational records. There are also new quantitative techniques and programs for analyzing
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and discovering patterns in huge amount of digital data (Attewell and Monaghan ). This kind
of analysis may reveal systematic patterns, network dynamics, historical trends, communica-
tion structures, hiding techniques, organizational features, ties between business people and
political ofﬁceholders, the concentration of public procurement market, and highlight
typical clusters of winners in different types of tenders and economic sectors (Aven 2012;
Baker and Faulkner 1993; Fazekas et al. 2013).
Another option for research is to obtain rich descriptions of ‘real world’ corrupt transactions
based upon qualitative ﬁeldwork that looks at corrupt relationships or details the ways that
corrupt rackets operate. Snowball sampling, a process in which each interviewed person
suggests other respondents who may have knowledge relevant to the research topic, would
be especially suitable in corruption research when the target population is hidden, and it is hard
to identify and contact potential subjects (Becker 1966; Lindesmith 1968). Based on in-depth
interviews or other qualitative techniques, this type of research might reveal important infor-
mation about human agency such as the corrupt actor’s strategies and motivations, negotiating,
timing and decision-making processes, the role of other actors, and different forms of resources
allocated between them (Jancsics 2013; Rivkin-Fish 2005). However qualitative methods are
also effective in identifying systemic elements, the symbolic and material patterns embedded
into relational structures (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Based on the systematic analysis of such
narratives, the researcher can integrate the pieces of the complex puzzle of corruption. I believe
that research projects following the relational framework may be useful for testing pre-existing
models of rational-actor, structural, and relational approaches. Yet, they are also viable tools for
revealing new patterns that emerge from the “black box” of corrupt practices.
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